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Game theory, once considered a purely mathematical science, has evolved much 
in recent years. Although still considered a branch of mathematics because of its 
need for rigor and precise analysis, game theory has several applications to the 
social and biological sciences. This paper provides a survey of the historical 
evolution of game theory, defines game theory and the principle theorem serving 
as its cornerstone, and discusses practical applications of game theory in both 
economic and social situations. 
I. Historical Overview 
Although some scholars believe that the historical forerunner of game theory was 
probability theory, probability theory did not originate until the seventeenth century. Probability 
theory, or the theory of games of chance, is traced by most historians to 1654, when French 
mathematicians Blaise Pascal and Pierre de Fermat, inspired by the gambling misfortunes of 
French nobleman Chevalier de Mere, made efforts to solve practical problems of gambling 
(Colman, 1982, p. 11). Historical evidence points out that game theory, or the theory of games 
of strategy, can be dated to much earlier times. 
I. A. Early Contributions to Game Theory 
The beginning of game theory can be traced to ancient times. The Babylonian Talmud, 
written during the first five centuries A.D., is the compilation of ancient law and tradition which 
serves as the basis of Jewish religious, criminal, and civil law. One dilemma discussed in the 
Talmud is the so-called marriage contract problem: A man has three wives whose marriage 
contracts specify that, in the case of his death, they are to receive estates worth 100, 200, and 300 
1 
[units] each. The Talmud apparently gives contradictory recommendations. In the case where 
the man dies leaving an estate of only 100, the Talmud recommends equal division among the 
wives. If the estate is worth 300, however, then the Talmud recommends the proportional 
division of (50, 100, 150). For an estate worth 200, the recommendation is a mysterious (50, 75, 
75). This particular dilemma has baffled Talmudic scholars for two millennia. In 1985, in the 
Journal of Economic Theory, it was recognized that the Talmud anticipates the modern theory of 
cooperative games. Each solution corresponds to the nucleolus of an appropriately defined game 
(Walker). 
Centuries later, in a letter dated 13 November 1713, James Waldegrave provided the first 
known minimax mixed strategy solution to a two-person game. Waldegrave's letter, written to 
Pierre-Remond de Montmort, included discussion about a two-person version of the card game le 
Her. Waldegrave' s solution is a minimax mixed strategy equilibrium, but Waldegrave made no 
general extension of his result to other games. He was concerned that a mixed strategy "does not 
seem to be in the usual rules of play" of games of chance (Walker). 
It was not until 200 years later that the first major contribution to game theory was made. 
In 1912, German mathematician Ernst Zermelo proved that every strictly competitive game of 
perfect information possesses either a guaranteed winning strategy for one of the players or 
guaranteed drawing strategies for both. This result applies to games such as chess and tic-tac-toe 
in which each player knows what moves have been made previously, but Zermelo failed to 
provide a systematic method for determining the winning or drawing strategies. It has been 
found that tic-tac-toe has drawing strategies for both players; if it is played rationally it must end 
in a draw. In the case of chess, however, it is still unknown as to whether one of the players has 
a winning strategy or whether both players have drawing strategies, although many speculate that 
the latter is true (Colman, 1995, p. 12 - 13). 
A decade later much of the groundwork of game theory was laid by French 
mathematician Emile Borel. Between 1921 and 1927 Borel published several notes on strategic 
games. Borel gave the first modern formulation of mixed strategy, and he found the minimax 
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solution for two-person games with three or five possible strategies (Walker). But even Borel 
could not prove the fundamental Minimax Theorem (see Section III), a theorem which serves as 
the cornerstone of formal game theory (Colman, 1995, p. 13). 
I. B. John van Neumann, the RAND Corporation, and the Arms Race 
In the mid 1920s, Austro-Hungarian mathematician John von Neumann began studying 
the mathematical structure of poker and other games; he wondered if there is a rational way to 
play every game. Von Neumann, also popularly known for his major contributions to the design 
of high-speed electronic computers that were important in the development of the hydrogen 
bomb, was the first major figure in game theory. He approached his "poker problem" with 
mathematical rigor, and in 1928 he succeeded in proving the Minimax Theorem applicable to 
two-person zero-sum games. Von Neumann succeeded in proving that there is always a right, or 
optimal, way to play such games. He believed that the Minimax Theorem would pave the way 
for a more formal game theory that would eventually include other types of games, including 
those of n-players and those where the players' interests partially overlap. So expanded, he 
believed, game theory could be applied to any type of human conflict (Poundstone, p. 7). 
It is worth noting that although von Neumann is often given credit for "inventing" game 
theory, strong parallels between the papers of von Neumann and Borel do exist. For instance, 
both used poker as an example and both examined the problem of bluffing. And just as von 
Neumann appreciated the potential economic and military applications of game theory, so did 
Borel. As minister of the French Navy in 1925, Borel even warned against overly simplistic 
applications of game theory to warfare. Perhaps most importantly, Borel asked the two basic 
questions of game theory even though he did not develop these issues very far: For which games 
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is there a best strategy? and How does one find such a strategy? Many believe that von 
Neumann was jealous of prior claims to his innovation, and von Neumann's early works make 
but scant mention of Borel. Lest there be any doubt, von Neumann's longtime friend, 
mathematician Stanislaw Ulam, reported that von Neumann's work was in fact inspired by one 
of Borel's papers (Poundstone, pp. 41- 42). 
In 1944, von Neumann and Princeton economist Oskar Morgenstern published their 
analysis of game theory in Theory of Games and Economic Behavior. Their purpose for writing 
this book was to analyze problems about how people behave in economic situations. In their 
words, these problems "have their origin in the attempts to find an exact description of the 
endeavor of the individual to obtain a maximum of utility, or, in the case of the entrepreneur, a 
maximum of profit" (Morris, p. viii). Von Neumann and Morgenstern presented their game 
theory as a mathematical foundation for economics, and their book stimulated much interest 
among mathematicians and mathematically-inclined economists (Colman, 1995, p. 13). A 
review of their book in the "American Mathematical Society Bulletin" predicted, "Posterity may 
regard this book as one of the major scientific achievements of the first half of the twentieth 
century. This will undoubtedly be the case if the authors have succeeded in establishing a new 
exact science -- the science of economics" (Poundstone, pp. 7 - 8). 
One of the places where game theory was immediately accepted was at a prototypic think 
tank called the RAND (Research ANd Development) Corporation. The RAND Corporation is a 
nonprofit research organization that was started by the U.S. Air Force after World War II. The 
Corporation studies various policy problems of the U.S., especially those involving national 
defense (World Book Encyclopedia, Q-R, p. 134). The RAND Corporation was originally 
developed to perform strategic studies on intercontinental nuclear war, and for that reason RAND 
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took on a large orbit of stellar thinkers as full-time researchers and outside consultants. RAND 
even considered game theory important enough to hire von Neumann as a consultant and to 
devote a great deal of effort not only to studying military applications of game theory but also to 
doing basic research in the field (Poundstone, p. 8). 
Interestingly, in the years following von Neumann and Morgenstern 's publication, game 
theory acquired a strange reputation among the general public. Many of the early researchers in 
game theory were supported partially or entirely by the U.S. Department of Defense or were 
somehow connected to the RAND Corporation. These researchers worked on problems 
involving nuclear confrontation with the Soviet Union and wrote about these problems as if they 
were simply interesting, complex games. Because the bloody realities of nuclear war were 
hardly mentioned, game theory was often identified with war gaming and was thought of as cold 
and inhuman. At the same time, the power of game theory was overstated. It was believed that 
game theory could solve problems that were, in fact , far too difficult for it and for the technology 
(namely computers) of that time. Later, in a reaction to this, there was a tendency to undervalue 
game theory. In reality, game theory is neither all-powerful nor merely a mathematician ' s toy 
without relevance to the real world (Morris, p. vii); this becomes more apparent the deeper one 
delves into the topic of game theory. 
In 1949 the Soviet Union exploded its first atomic bomb in Siberia thus ending the U.S. 
nuclear monopoly. The Soviet bomb sparked a nuclear arms race and the world now had two 
atomic powers. For the first time in the history of the world, it was now possible to launch a 
surprise nuclear attack that would completely wipe out an enemy nation. By 1950 some U.S. 
citizens decided that the U.S. should consider an immediate, unprovoked nuclear attack on the 
Soviets; this idea went by the euphemistic name of preventive war. Today it may not seem 
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conceivable that the preventive war movement would find much more support than with a lunatic 
fringe; in reality, however, many of the undeniably intelligent of this country supported the 
movement. Among these supporters were two of the brightest mathematicians of the time: 
Bertrand Russell and von Neumann. And while these two men differed in many aspects, they did 
agree that the world did not have room for two atomic superpowers (Poundstone, p. 4). 
Russell spoke publicly in favor of issuing an ultimatum to the Soviets threatening them 
with nuclear devastation unless they surrendered sovereignty to a U.S.-dominated world state. In 
a 1947 speech, Russell said: "I am inclined to think that Russia would acquiesce; if not, 
provided this is done soon, the world might survive the resulting war and emerge with a single 
government such as the world needs" (Poundstone, p. 4). Von Neumann took an even tougher 
stance in favoring a surprise nuclear first-strike. He was quoted in Life magazine as saying, "If 
you say why not bomb them [the Soviets] tomorrow, I say why not today? If you say today at 
five o'clock, I say why not one o'clock?" (Poundstone, p. 4). 
Clearly, neither Russell nor von Neumann had any love for the Soviets, and they believed 
that preventive war was foremost a matter of logic. They saw preventive war as the only rational 
solution to the deadly dilemma of nuclear proliferation. As Russell put it in a 1948 New 
Commonwealth article advocating preventive war: "The argument that I have been developing is 
as simple and as unescapable as a mathematical demonstration" (Poundstone, p. 4 ). But logic 
itself can go awry. Perhaps nothing captures the whole bizarre episode of preventive war better 
than the unintentionally Orwellian words of U.S. Secretary of Navy Francis P. Matthews, who in 
1950 urged the nation to become aggressors for peace (Poundstone, pp. 4 - 5). 
In January of 1950, two RAND scientists made what some scholars believe is the most 
influential discovery in game theory since its inception. Melvin Dresher and Merrill Flood 
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carried out an experiment which introduced the game now known as the Prisoner's Dilemma 
(Walker). This Prisoner's Dilemma is a simple, baffling game that challenged part of the 
theoretical basis of game theory back in 1950 and is an intellectual riddle that still puzzles many 
today (Poundstone, p. 8). Although theorists now realize that the Prisoner's Dilemma is a 
universal concept that has practical applications to biology, psychology, sociology, economics, 
law, and other disciplines where a conflict of interests may exist, Prisoner's Dilemma was 
"discovered" just as nuclear proliferation and the arms race were becoming serious concerns. 
The tensions of the early nuclear era are a classic illustration of a Prisoner's Dilemma (see 
Section V) (Poundstone, p. 9). 
Perhaps author William Poundstone best summed up the concept of the Prisoner's 
Dilemma when he wrote: 
In the last years of his life, von Neumann saw the realities of war becoming more 
like a fictional dilemma or the abstract games of his theory. The perils of the 
nuclear age are often attributed to "technical progress outstripping ethical 
progress." This diagnosis is all the more disheartening for the suspicion that there 
is no such thing as ethical progress, that bombs get bigger and people stay the 
same. The Prisoner's Dilemma has become one of the premier philosophical and 
scientific issues of our time. It is tied to our very survival (Poundstone, p. 9). 
Study of the Prisoner's Dilemma has great power for helping to explain why human and animal 
societies are organized as they are. Indeed, it is one of the great ideas of the twentieth century, 
simple enough for anyone to grasp and of fundamental importance. 
I. C. John Nash 
After von Neumann, the next major figure in game theory was RAND consultant and 
mathematician John Nash. In the early 1950s, Nash took game theory to a level that von 
Neumann and Morgenstern had not; Nash studied non-cooperative games where coalitions are 
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forbidden. Von Neumann and Morgenstern's handling of games of more than two players 
focused on coalitions, or groups of players who choose to act in concert. These game theorists 
supposed that rational players would consider the consequences of joining every possible 
coalition and choose the one most advantageous. This approach seems reasonable given von 
Neumann and Morgenstern's grand aim, which was to treat economic conflicts as n-person 
games (Poundstone, pp. 96 - 97). For example, businesses collaborate to fix prices or to drive a 
competitor out of the market and workers join unions to bargain collectively. In each instance it 
is logical to expect that parties will form coalitions whenever it is advantageous. In effect, this is 
the basis of a laissez-faire, or free-market, economy (Poundstone, p. 97). 
The only type of non-cooperative games that von Neumann concerned himself with were 
two-person zero-sum games, which are necessarily non-cooperative. Because one player's gain 
is the other player's loss, there is no point in forming a coalition in two-person zero-sum games. 
That case, however, was already covered by von Neumann's Minimax Theorem, and so Nash's 
work was primarily concerned with non-zero-sum games of three or more players (Poundstone, 
p. 97). 
Von Neumann's Minimax Theorem proved that any two rational beings who find their 
interests diametrically opposed can nonetheless settle on a rational course of action in confidence 
that the other will do the same. This rational solution of a zero-sum game is an equilibrium 
reached as a result of self-interest and mistrust, where the mistrust is reasonable in view of the 
opposing aims of the players (Poundstone, p. 97). 
Nash expanded on von Neumann's findings by showing that equilibrium solutions also 
exist for non-zero-sum two-person games. In two papers entitled "Equilibrium Points in N-
Person Games" (1950) and "Non-cooperative Games" (1951), Nash proved the existence of a 
strategic equilibrium for non-cooperative games, which is referred to as the Nash equilibrium 
(see Section IV) (Walker). Although it might seem that when two players ' interests are not 
completely opposed, it would be even easier to find a rational solution, but this is not the case. 
In fact it is often harder, and such solutions are often less satisfying (Poundstone, p. 97) . 
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I. D. Other Contributions to Game Theory 
In 1957, RAND alumni Duncan Luce and Howard Raiffa published the text Games and 
Decisions. The book begins: "In all of man's written record there has been a preoccupation with 
conflict of interest; possibly only the topics of God, love, and inner struggle have received 
comparable attention" (Poundstone, p. 236). They gave the Prisoner's Dilemma much emphasis 
in this book, and wrote: "The hopelessness that one feels in such a game as this cannot be 
overcome by a play on the words rational and irrational; it is inherent in the situation" 
(Poundstone, p. 121). As a whole, this book made game theory accessible to a wide range of 
social scientists and psychologists (Colman, 1995, p. 13). 
In 1962, Martin Shubik wrote "Incentives, Decentralized Control, the Assignment of 
Joint Costs and Internal Pricing," which turned out to be one of the first applications of game 
theory to cost allocation. An article describing an early use of game theory in insurance was 
written by Karl Borch in 1962. In "Application of Game Theory to Some Problems in 
Automobile Insurance," Borch indicated how game theory can be applied to determine premiums 
for different classes of insurance when required total premium for all classes is given. In 1994, 
Douglas G. Baird, Robert H. Gertner, and Randal C. Picker published Game Theory and the 
Law, one of the first books in law and economics to take an explicitly game theoretic approach to 
the subject (Walker). In a very short time it had become obvious to scholars in a wide range of 
disciplines that game theory could be applied not only to mathematics, but also to economics, 
politics, foreign policy, as well as other areas of the social and biological sciences (Poundstone, 
pp. 5 - 7). 
II. Defining Game Theory 
Game theorist and author Anatol Rapoport defined game theory in an unconventional yet 
effective manner when he wrote: 
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Game theory is largely ... concerned with the classification of games, and in this it 
has much in common with other sciences which at a certain stage of their 
development were concerned mainly with classification. For example, biology 
was for many centuries a classification science (a taxonomy). Biologists sought a 
"proper" way to classify plants and animals. It would seem at first that what the 
"proper" principles of classification are depends largely on what the classifier is 
interested in. For instance, someone corning into frequent contact with animals in 
a primitive life environment might classify animals into large and small, or into 
dangerous and harmless, or into edible and inedible. There comes a time, 
however, when observation and description of nature becomes more or less 
separated from immediate functional interests. Accordingly, biologists soon 
recognized that although mice and lizards were both small animals while horses 
and crocodiles were both large animals, nevertheless mice were more closely 
related to horses than to lizards while crocodiles were more closely related to 
lizards than to horses (Rapoport, pp. 15 - 16). 
Rapoport continued by saying: 
The principle according to which game theory classifies games is best understood 
if game theory is viewed as the branch of mathematics concerned with the formal 
aspect of rational decision. The emphasis here is on the word formal, which in 
this context means devoid of content (Rapoport, p. 16). 
As stated earlier, game theory is considered a branch of mathematics because of its need for rigor 
and precise analysis, and mathematics does not consider content in situations of formal relations. 
For example, arithmetic is not concerned with apples, candy bars, or tuition dollars; rather, it is 
concerned with the relationship among numbers. Geometry is not concerned with land tracts or 
shapes of objects but only with spatial relationships. Analogously, a mathematical theory of 
rational decision is concerned not with the dilemma of making wise decisions but with the 
logical structure of problems which arise in connection with the necessity of making decisions 
(Rapoport, p. 16). 
The mathematical theory of games is concerned with the logic of decision making in 
conflict situations. Game theory does not deal with any particular game but with all of them, not 
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with technical but with theoretical matters. For example, "What is the best way to play Chess?" 
is not a game-theoretical question, whereas "Is there a best way to play Chess?" is a game-
theoretical question (Rapoport, p. 14). 
Game theory is applicable to conflict situations where the following three properties hold: 
( 1) There are two or more decision makers, called players; 
(2) Each player has a choice of two or more ways of acting, called strategies, such 
that the outcome of the interaction depends on the strategy choices of all of the 
players; 
(3) Each player has well-defined preferences among the possible outcomes so that 
numerical payoffs reflecting these preferences could be assigned to all players for 
all outcomes (Colman, 1995, p. 3). 
An essential feature of these conflict situations is that each player only has partial control over 
the outcome and that each player is perfect in reasoning and in mental skills. Games in which 
the outcome depends solely or partially on dexterity or physical strength are therefore not 
relevant to the matter at hand (Bacharach, p. 1). Thus, it is immediately obvious that games such 
as chess and poker fall within the bounds of game theory, while other activities that are 
commonly referred to as games (i.e. hopscotch, space invaders, and solitaire) are not really 
games in the technical sense (Colman, 1982, p. 3). 
The primary objective of mathematical game theory is to determine, through logical 
reasoning alone, what strategies the players should decide upon and what outcomes will result. 
Strictly mathematical game theory is therefore normative rather than descriptive in that it seeks 
to discover how players should act in order to pursue their own interests most effectively as 
opposed to predicting how players will act in a social situation; thus, strictly mathematical game 
theory cannot be tested by experimental means (Colman, 1995, p. 4). 
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Game theory as it is applied to the social and biological sciences, on the other hand, has 
proved useful in helping to explain and predict behavior in a wide range of situations. 
Predictions derived from informal, or non-mathematical, game theory can be tested through 
empirical research, and even if satisfactory formal situations cannot be found, non-mathematical 
game theory can provide illuminating insights. Many will argue that certain important features 
of individual and collective rationality, cooperation and competition, trust and suspicion, threats 
and commitments cannot be clearly described or explained, without the framework of game 
theory (Colman, 1995, p. 4). Thus, game theory can be thought of as the study of conflict 
between thoughtful and potentially deceitful players who are assumed to be perfectly rational and 
who wish to maximize their objective functions given their perceptions about the environment. 
This goal of understanding why players in competitive situations act as they do is especially 
relevant when the game is on a large scale with many players and complicated rules. The 
economy and international politics are two good examples (Morris, p. vii) . 
//. A. Formal Representations of Games 
Understanding the terminology and notation used in game theory is key in deciphering 
difficult theorems and evaluating conflict situations. Thus, it is worth the reader's time to 
carefully study the ideas presented in this section. 
The three most common ways of formally representing games are described below: 
(1) Extensive Form. The most complete description of games is called extensive 
form. It details the various stages of the interaction, the conditions under which a 
player has to move, the information a player holds at different stages, and the 
motivation of the players. 
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(2) Normal Form (or Strategic Form). This is a more abstract representation of a 
game. Here one notes all of the possible strategies of each player together with 
the payoff that results from strategy choices of the players. In the normal form, 
many details of the extensive form are omitted. This form allows one to 
concentrate on the strategic aspects of a game, but it neglects the dynamic 
structure of the game. 
(3) Characteristic Function Form (or Coalitional Form). Whereas the normal 
form can be viewed as a reduced version of the extensive form, the characteristic 
function form of a game represents more than just a further abstraction from 
details of the game. It is a description of social interactions where binding 
agreements can be made and enforced. Binding agreements allow groups of 
players, or coalitions, to commit themselves to actions that may be against the 
interest of individual players once the agreement is carried through. This 
representation of a game is particularly useful for analyzing distributional 
questions. The distribution of payoffs from the joint outcome among the 
members of a coalition will determine what kind of agreement can be reached and 
what kind of coalitions will form (Eichberger, pp. 1 - 2). 
For the purposes of this paper, both the extensive form and the normal form are discussed in 
greater detail. 
II. A. 1. Extensive Form 
The extensive form gives the most detailed description of a game. It tells exactly which 
player should move, when the player should move, what the possible moves are, the outcomes 
corresponding to each move, and the information of the players at each stage (Handbook of 
Game Theory, p. 20). 
In any game, the set of players can be denoted by I. In most applications, it is described 
by listing its elements as / = { 1, 2, .. . , /}, where I is a finite set. A given player from the set / is 
denoted by i, where i E / (Eichberger, p. 3). 
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The extensive form of a game is perhaps best represented diagrammatically by means of a 
game tree, or a tree graph. In such a tree, each point, or node, represents a point in the game 
where a decision and thus a move must be made; this move is either the decision of a player or a 
chance event (Thomas, p. 23). A game can be characterized by a set of nodes N. A move, or 
action, of a player takes him from one node to the next. The set of possible actions in a game is 
denoted by A, regardless of which player takes them (Eichberger, p. 3 ). 
If a, b, c, ... denote the nodes (positions) of a game and if a, p, x, ... denote the actions of 
the same game, then it is possible to specify various orders of nodes indicating how one position 
arises from another. In the game tree below (Figure 1 ), the set of nodes is N = { a, b, c, d, e, f, g, 
h} and the set of actions is A = { a, p, X, 8, £, <1>, y}. Players can reach the nodes of a game tree by 
moving along the branches from left to right. Note that while each node in the left tree has a 
unique predecessor, node e in the right tree has two predecessors, namely band c (Eichberger, p. 
4). 
Figure I: Game Trees Representing Sequences of' Moving 
(Courtesy: Eichberger, p. 3) 
ln many games, such as checkers or chess, it is not unheard of for different sequences of 
moves to lead to the same position of the figures. In the right tree of Figure 1, for example, 
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position e can be reached by moving from node b by way of action <> or by moving from node c 
by way of action £ . Representing a game using such a tree, therefore, leads to uncertainty as to 
how node e was reached. To eliminate this confusion, if a player can arrive at the same point in a 
game by two or more different sequences of moves, the moves will always be distinguished by 
different nodes. Thus, for the purposes of game theory, the situation shown in the right tree of 
Figure 1 cannot occur. 
In this representation of the extensive form, examples will necessarily involve finite sets 
of actions A and finite sets of nodes N. This restriction allows the game theorist to 
diagrammatically represent games in game tree form. In the formal definitions, however, the 
restrictions of finite sets of actions and nodes can be relaxed (Eichberger, p. 4). 
The initial node of a game tree is denoted by o, for origin. Let cr: N -, N be the function 
that associates with each node other than the origin o, its predecessor, and for the origin, define 
cr(o) = o (Eichberger, p. 4) . For any node n EN and for any positive integer k, cr\n) indicates the 
kth iteration of the function cr, that is, 
a\n) = a(a(a( .. :a(n) ... ))). 
k-t1mes 
By definition, then, a game tree is a set of nodes Nanda function cr: N -, N, cr(o) = o, 
such that, for all nodes n E N, d(n) = o for some positive integer k holds. Here the condition 
cr\n) = o for all n is necessary to ensure that all nodes are connected to the origin, that is, that the 
nodes actually form a tree (Eichberger, pp. 4 - 5). 
15 
By considering Figure 1 once again, the reader will notice that the set of nodes is N = { a, 
b, c, d, e, f, g, h}, and the origin is node a where o = a. In the left tree of Figure 1, the following 
is true: 
cr(h) = cr(g) = cr(f) = c, cr(e) = cr(d) = b, cr(b) = cr(c) = a. 
Additionally, the condition that all nodes must be connected with the origin is satisfied in the left 
tree since the following is true: 
cr\ h) = cr(cr(h)) = a, cr2(g) = cr(cr(g )) = a, 
cr
2
(f) = cr(cr(f)) = a, cr\ e) = cr(cr(e)) = a, 
cr2(d) = cr(cr(d)) = a. 
The right tree does not satisfy the definition of game tree since e has two predecessors and the 
function cr is not defined for node e (Eichberger, p. 5). 
In addition to wanting to know at which node a player is positioned, a game theorist 
generally wants to know how actions lead the player from one node to the next. This can be 
expressed through the predecessor action function a: N \ { o} ~ A , which associates with each 
node n (except the origin o) the action a(n) leading from the predecessor node cr(n) to the node n 
(Eichberger, p. 5). Thus, the function a for the left tree of Figure 1 can be explicitly written as: 
a(b) = a, a(c) = ~. a(d) = X, a(e) = o, 
a(f) = £ , a(g) = q>, a (h) = y. 
16 
Here the action leading from cr(n) ton is uniquely defined for all of the nodes in N except for the 
initial node o = a. Recall that by definition there is no action leading to the initial node o = a 
(Eichberger, pp. 5 - 6). 
When analyzing a game, a game theorist may be interested in knowing in which 
situations the players are required to make decisions and in which situations the game must end. 
Thus, nodes are described as either decision nodes or terminal nodes. Let cr-'(n) be the inverse 
image of the function cr, that is, the set of nodes that have node n as a predecessor (Eichberger, p. 
6). A node is labeled a terminal node if it is the predecessor of no other node (i.e. if cr-'(n) = 0 
holds). Any nodes that are not terminal nodes are decision nodes. Hence, the set of all terminal 
nodes can be written as 7(N) = {n EN I cr-'(n) = 0} and the set of all decision nodes as .Z,(N) = 
N \ 7(N). Furthermore, the terminal nodes and decision nodes partition the set of nodes by the 
following two conditions: .Z,(N) u 7(N) = N and .Z,(N) n 7(N) = 0 ; that is, each node must 
belong to either the set of terminal nodes 7(N) or to the set of decision nodes .Z,(N), but no 
node can belong to both (Eichberger, p. 6). By considering the case of the left game tree in 
Figure 1, the reader will notice that the set of terminal nodes is 7(N) = { d, e, J, g, h} and the set 
of decision nodes is .Z,(N) = { a, b, c}. 
With the predecessor action function a, a game theorist can identify the actions available 
at any decision node of a game tree. For any node n E .Z,(N), let A(n) be the set of actions a (m) 
from nodes m that haven as their predecessor node; that is, let A(n) = { a(m) I cr(m) = n}. Here 
the reader may notice that the set of actions at terminal node n is not well defined; this justifies 
the terminology of calling nodes in .Z,(N) decision nodes (Eichberger, p. 7). 
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The set of decision nodes .2)(N) can be partitioned into mutually exclusive subsets N,, 
iEI where N, denotes the set of decision nodes at which player iE/ must choose an action. A list 
of mutually exclusive sets of decision nodes for each player, (N),E, is called a player partition of 
.2)(N) (Eichberger, p. 7). Because a player partition assigns nodes to players who have to make 
a decision there, it is possible to define the set of all possible actions of some player i, A,, as the 
union of all sets A(n) over nodes n in N,. 




l • a • f 
~~ •c -g 
2~ 
'Y •h 
Figure 2: A Player Partition 
(Courtesy: Eichberger, p. 7) 
Notice that the decision nodes in Figure 2 are nodes a, b, and c. Suppose that in this game, 
Player 1 makes the first move at decision node a and Player 2 makes the next move at either 
decision node b or c, depending upon Player 1 's move. Then the set of decision nodes .2)(N) 
can be split up into decision nodes of Player 1, N
1 
= {a}, and of Player 2, N2 = { b, c}. Thus, the 
player partition of this game is (N
1
, NJ (Eichberger, p. 7) . 
In Figure 2 the decision nodes are labeled with a I or a 2 to reflect which player is 
making a move. And the following sets of actions at the decision nodes .2)(N) = { a, h, c) exist: 
A(a) ={a,~}, A(b) = {X, 8), A(c) = {E, <j), yl. 
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Here, the set of actions for Player 1 is A, = { a, P} and the set of actions for Player 2 is A
2 
= { X, D, 
E, <j>, y} (Eichberger, p. 8). 
Also of interest to the game theorist are the payoffs of the players at the conclusion of the 
game. These payoffs are indicated at the terminal node of the game tree. The payoff function 
associates with each terminal node nE 7(N) a payoff vector (r,(n), r/n), .. . , r/n)) that specifies 
the payoff for each player. Thus, for each player i E /, r;(n) is a number that indicates the payoff 
to Player i if terminal node n is reached. By definition, then, the payoff function r: 7(N) ----, 9\' 
associates with each terminal node a vector of real numbers, the payoff to each of the players for 
each terminal node (Eichberger, p. 8). Figure 3 indicates how payoffs are shown on a game tree. 
For game trees in general, the first number indicates the payoff of Player l at that terminal node, 
the second number indicates the payoff of Player 2 at that same node, and so on. The payoffs in 
Figure 3 are as follows: 
for Player 1: r,(d) = 1, 
for Player 2: r/d) = 0, 














- 2, 5 
4, 5 
Figure 3: Player Payoffs 
(Courtesy: Eichberger, p. 8) 
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r, (g) = -2, 
r2 (g) = 5, 
and r, (h) = 4. 
and r2 (h) = 5. 
Up to this point, a game theorist can gather much information about a game from the 
game trees already presented. But the description of the extensive form already presented has 
failed to account for the situation where a player cannot observe the moves of his opponent(s). 
Since actions lead players from node to node, a player who cannot observe the action of his 
opponent(s) will not know at which node he is positioned (Eichberger, p.l 1 ). The following 
Matching Pennies example illustrates the aforementioned information problem: 
Matching Pennies: Two players, Player 1 and Player 2 each put a coin on the 
table but keep their moves hidden from each other. Player 1 puts her coin down 
first, then Player 2 does the same. Finally, they reveal to each other the sides of 
the coins lying face up on the table. If the sides match, Player 1 wins a dollar 
from Player 2; if the sides do not match, Player 2 wins a dollar (Eichberger, pp. 11 
- 12). 
Let H denote "heads" and T denote "tails" for Player 1. Similarly, let h denote "heads" for and t 





Figure 4: Matching Pennies Example 





While the two game trees in Figure 4 are nearly identical in appearance, the game tree on 
the left fails to indicate the fact that Player 2 cannot observe Player l's move and thus does not 
know if she is at node b or node c when making his move. In order to show that a player is 
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unable to distinguish nodes, the decision nodes that are indistinguishable in the set are joined into 
what is called an information set. In a game tree diagram,' information sets are often indicated by 
joining relevant nodes with a dotted line (Eichberger, p. 12). Because the right tree in Figure 4 
indicates the information set of Player 2, it is the correct representation of the Matching Pennies 
game. 
An information set, denoted by u, is a set of decision nodes for a given player. In the 
right tree of Figure 4, the information set for Player 2 is u = { b, c}. And because it is possible for 
an information set to contain a single node, the information set for Player l is u' = {a} 
(Eichberger, p. 12). 
In order for an information set to reflect the idea that a player is not certain as to at which 
node he is positioned, the following conditions must hold: 
( 1) Information sets of Player i El contain only decision nodes of Player i. 
(2) Each decision node of Player i is contained in one and only one information 
set of this player. 
(3) The same choices must be available to a player at all nodes of an information 
set (Eichberger, p. 13). 
Conditions (1) and (2) indicate that information sets partition the set of decision nodes of 
a player, say N;. Nodes in the same information set are distinguishable for this player 
(Eichberger, p. 13). Additionally, U; denotes the set of all information sets for each player iE/. 
Condition (3) indicates that for any information set u, A(x) = A(y) for all x, y Eu. The set 
of choices at u, denoted A(u), is therefore unambiguously given by the set of actions available at 
some node of this information set, A(u) = A(x) for some xEu (Eichberger, p. 13). 
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The right game tree of the Matching Pennies example illustrates these concepts. In the 
Matching Pennies example, each player has a single information set, namely V
1 
= { {a} } and v
2 
= 
{ { b, c} } . The set of actions at the three decision nodes a, b, and c are: 
A(a) = {H, T}, A(b) = {h, t}, A ( c) = { h, t } . 
The information set of Player l contains only one node, {a}, and the set of choices at this node is 
A( {a}) = A(a) = {H, T} . The information set of Player 2, however, contains two nodes. The 
actions at these two nodes must be the same: A({b, c}) = A(b) = A(c) = {h, t}. These properties 
can be summarized as follows : V; is the set of information sets of Player i El. For any u EV;, the 
set of choices at u is denoted by A(u). The list of all of these sets ( V) :=, is called information 
partition (Eichberger, p. 13). 










1, -1 . 1, -1 
Figure 5: Equivalent Representations of the Matching Pennies Example 
(Courtesy: Eichberger, p. 14) 
If the players of a game do not know the decisions of their opponents when making their 
moves, then a situation of simultaneous moving occurs. Thus, in the case of simultaneous 
moving it does not matter if the choices literally occur at the same moment; rather, it only 
matters that the players are lacking information about their opponents' decisions. The sequence 
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of moves is immaterial in a simultaneous move game; the information that the players have when 
they make their choices is what is important (Eichberger, p. 14). And because this is true, there 
is often more than one way to formally represent a simultaneous move game in game tree form. 
The two game trees in Figure 5 are equivalent representations of the Matching Pennies example 
where each player puts down a coin at the same time. 
The following summarizes the new terminology and notation that has been presented in 
this section: 
• the set of players / 
• a set of situations N and the sequence of their appearance cr, the game tree (N, 
cr) 
• the set of actions and a function that relates actions to nodes (A, a) 
• who comes to move at the decision nodes, the player partition (N);Ei 
• which decision nodes each player can distinguish, the set of information sets U 
• what choices a player has at each information set, the set of choices at 
information sets (A(u)),,e u 
• what the payoffs to the players are when the game ends, the payoff function r 
(Eichberger, p. 15) 
By definition, a game in extensive form is completely defined by the following list r : 
r = (/, (N, cr), (A, a), (N);Ei• U, (A(u)),,eu, r). 
Consider the following game in extensive form (see Figure 6). 
d 
• r (d) , r Cd) 2/ 1 z 
y·~: 
l • a f 
~y· 
r (e),r (e) 
l 2 




r (g), r (g) 
l 2 
Figure 6: A Game in Extensive Form 
(Courtesy: Eichberger, p. 15) 
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The above game tree can be described as follows: 
I={l,2}, 
N = { a, b, c, d, e, J, g} 
cr(a) = a, cr(b) = a, cr(c) = a, cr(d) = b, 
cr(e) = b, O"(j) = C, O"(g) = C, 
A = { U, D, T, B, t, b}, 
a(b) = U, a(c) = D, a(d) = T, a(e) = B, a(j) = t, a(g) = b, 
N, = {a}, N2 = { b, c}, 
U, = { {a} }, U2 = { { b}, { C} }, 
A({a}) = {U, D}, A({b}) = {T, B}, A( { c}) = { t, b}. 
The reader is referred to any book on Graph Theory for further details about game trees. 
II. A. 2. Normal Form 
In the normal, or strategic, form of a game, the players can make all of the moves that 
they could make in the "original" game, and they receive the same payoffs, but the sequential 
nature of the moves is lost, as is the idea of perfect information. However, it is the same game, 
no matter which form is taken (Thomas, p. 28). 
When games are classified and conclusions about them are drawn according to the 
properties of the payoff matrix described below, the games are said to be in normal form. 
Because a game theorist assumes that the number of strategies available to each player in a given 
game is finite, he can therefore suppose that the strategies available to Player 1 are numbered 
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from l to N and those available to Player 2 are numbered from l to M. A game theorist can 
additionally describe each pair of strategies chosen by (i, j), where the i-th strategy can be chosen 
by Player 1 and the j-th strategy by Player 2. This pair determines an outcome, say Ow 
Mathematically speaking, the variable outcome 0;
1 
is a function of the two variables i and j. If all 
of the possible outcomes OiJ are arranged in a rectangular array of N rows (i = 1, 2, ... , N) and M 
columns U = l, 2, ... , M), then the game at hand is in matrix form and the entire strategic 
structure of the game is depicted (see Figure 7) (Rapoport, p. 46) . Practically, the theory of two-
person zero-sum games is often stated as a theory of games in normal form. 
2 M 
I Ou 
--1----1- - - -----






Figure 7: Normal Form in Matrix Representation 
(Courtesy: Rapoport, p. 46) 
The greatly simplified structure of games in normal form makes analysis of the behavior 
of the players much easier (Eichberger, p. 29). For that reason, many of the examples in this 
paper are represented in matrix form. 
Ill. The Minimax Theorem 
The genesis of game theory is often traced to John von Neumann's proof of the Minimax 
Theorem. Most books on game theory mention the Minimax Theorem, but it is seldom proved. 
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Non-mathematicians find von Neumann's proof to be too lengthy and complex to grasp, and for 
that reason the proof is often presented in text in a simplified form. A simplified version of the 
proof for the Minimax Theorem was developed by Andrew M. Colman, a Reader in Psychology 
at the University of Leicester and can be found in the appendix of his book entitled Game Theory 
& its Applications (1995). Colman's proof is intended to be more explicit and therefore easier to 
follow than those presented in mathematical textbooks, although a basic knowledge of 
elementary algebra and geometry is assumed. A complete understanding of the proof requires 
knowledge of probability theory and mathematical analysis. 
Preliminary comments about the Minimax Theorem and the theorem itself are presented 
below. See Colman's aforementioned book for more details. 
III. A. Preliminary Comments 
A finite, two-person, zero-sum game is specified by a rectangular array of 
numbers [a;), called a payoff matrix, with m rows and n columns. The numbers 
are the payoffs to Player I, and because the game is zero-sum, Player II' s payoffs 
are simply the negatives of these numbers. According to the rules of the game, 
Player I chooses a strategy corresponding to one of the rows, and 
simultaneously . .. Player II chooses a strategy corresponding to one of the 
columns. The number at the intersection of the chosen row and column is the 
payoff to Player I. Thus if Player I chooses row i and Player II chooses column j, 
then the number aij at the intersection is the amount gained by Player I and lost by 
Player II; in other words, the amount aij is transferred from Player II to Player I. 
Instead of deliberately selecting a pure strategy - a specific row or column - a 
player may use a randomizing device to choose among the strategies. A player 
with two pure strategies, for example, may choose one of them by tossing a coin. 
A player who chooses in this way is said to be using a mixed strategy. In general, 
a mixed strategy assigns a predetermined probability to each available pure 
strategy; in the coin-tossing example, for example, the assigned probabilities are 
1/2 and 1/2. A mixed strategy can be represented by a string of non-negative 
numbers of length m (for Player I) or n (for Player II) that sum to 1. A mixed 
strategy for Player I can accordingly be written (x) = (x,, x2 , ••• , x111) while a mixed 
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strategy for Player II (y) = (y,, y2, ••• , yJ, where x, ~ 0, x2 ~ 0, ... , x,,, ~ O; y, ~ 0, y2 
~ 0, ... , Yn ~ O; x, + x2 + ... + x,,, = 1; and y, + y2 + ... + Y,, = 1. A pure strategy can 
viewed as a special case of a mixed strategy in which a probability of 1 is 
assigned to one of the x; or yj and O to each of the others. 
If Player I uses a mixed strategy (x) and Player II uses a mixed strategy (y), then 
row i will be chosen with probability X; and column j with probability Yr Because 
these events are independent, the payoff aij will occur with probability xyr The 
expected payoff is then simply a weighted average of all of the payoffs a;p each 
one occurring with probability X;Yp and it can be written I:aux;yp where i = 1, 2, ... , 
m, and}= 1, 2, ... , n (Colman, 1995, p. 317 - 318). 
III. B. The Theorem 
Since the expected payoff indicates Player I's average gain and Player II' s average loss, 
Player I wishes to maximize it while Player II wishes to minimize it. If Player I knew in advance 
that Player II was going to use the mixed strategy, say (y'), then Player I's best counter-strategy 
would be to maximize the expected payoff against (y'); the expected payoff would then be 
If Player II knew Player I's mixed strategy, say (x'), in advance, then Player II could use a 
counter-strategy that minimizes the expected payoff of 
In reality, however, these counter-strategies cannot be implemented because neither 
player has perfect information about the other's plans. Player I can, however, ensure a maximum 
security level by assuming that Player II will approach any strategy x with the counter-strategy 
that minimizes the payoff in that situation and by choosing (x) so as to maximize the expected 
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payoff under this pessimistic assumption. Player I thus guarantees that the expected payoff will 
be no less than 
Similarly, Player H' s security level is maximized by the use of a strategy (y) that minimizes the 
expected payoff against Player I's maximizing counter-strategy against it. Thus, the expected 
payoff will not exceed 
Taking all of the above into consideration, we arrive at the following theorem: 
THE MINIMAX THEOREM: If [a) is any m x n payoff matrix, then 
where (x) = (x,, x
2
, ... , x
111
) and (y) = (y,, y
2
, ... , y,) represent all strings of non-negative numbers of 
length m, n, and sum 1 (Colman, 1985, pp317 - 319). 
IV. Two-person Zero-sum Games 
As mentioned earlier, a two-person zero-sum game is one in which one person wins and 
the other loses. That is, the payoffs to the players must add up to zero. With a two-person zero-
sum game, the interests of the two players are diametrically opposed -- an outcome that is 
favorable for one player is necessarily unfavorable for the other. Because each player can gain 
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only at the expense of the other, they are involved in a strictly competitive game; there are no 
prospects of mutually profitable collaboration (Colman, 1995, p. 53). Because two-person zero-
sum conflicts are amenable to formal analysis, many significant contributions to mathematical 
game theory relate to them. 
Many economic, political, military, and interpersonal conflicts correspond to strictly 
competitive games. Examples of these conflicts, if the opponents are diametrically opposed, may 
include the following: two television networks competing for audiences; two retailers competing 
for market shares; two politicians competing for votes; or two parents competing for the custody 
of their children after a divorce. It is a serious mistake to regard all competitive interactions as 
zero-sum games, however, because in reality the protagonists' interest are seldom strictly 
opposed (Colman, 1995, pp. 53-54). 
One example of a simple two-person zero-sum game is referred to by military historians 
as the Battle of Bismarck Sea, an incident occurring during the Second World War. The 
following account is based on the paper "Military Decision and Game Theory" written by 0. G. 
Haywood, Jr. in 1954. 
In February 1943, during the critical phase of the struggle in the south-western 
Pacific, the Allies received intelligence reports indicating that the Japanese were 
planning a troop and supply convoy to reinforce their army in New Guinea. The 
convoy could sail either north of the island of New Britain where rain and poor 
visibility were almost certain, or south of the island, where the weather would 
probably be fair. By either route, the trip would take three days. General George 
C. Kenney, commander of Allied forces in the South Pacific was ordered by his 
supreme commander, General MacArthur, to attack the convoy with the objective 
of inflicting maximum destruction. General Kenney had to decide whether to 
concentrate the bulk of his reconnaissance aircraft on the northern or southern 
route. Once the convoy was sighted, it would be bombed continuously until its 
arrival in New Guinea. 
The players in this game were General Kenney and the Japanese commander, 
Hitoshi Imamura. The strategies from which each had to choose were the 
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northern and southern routes. The outcomes were the number of days of bombing 
that would result from each possible combination of choices. Kenney's staff 
estimated that if the reconnaissance aircraft were concentrated mainly on the 
northern route, then the convoy would probably be sighted after one day, whether 
it sailed north or south, and would therefore be subjected to two days of bombing 
in either case. If the aircraft were concentrated mainly on the southern route, on 
the other hand, then either one or three days of bombing would result depending 
on whether the Japanese sailed north or south respectively. The number of days 
of bombing may be interpreted as Kenney's gains and the Japanese commander's 
losses. Because the Japanese payoffs are just the negatives of Kenney's, the game 
is obviously zero-sum (Colman, 1995, pp. 54-55). 
Although there are many ways to represent the above game, the game tree and payoff 
matrix are two of the simplest. In Figure 8, the extensive form of the game is represented by 
means of a game tree. Recall that each possible situation in a game is referred to as a node, and a 
move (or action) of a player leads from one node to the next (Eichberger, p. 3). The nodes of the 
game tree below are labeled with the names of the players whose choices they represent, and the 
branches of the tree represent the strategies between which the players must choose. The top-
most node is labeled "Imamura," and it refers to the Japanese commander who has the first 
move. The nodes at the second level refer to Kenney, the commander of the Allied forces in the 
South Pacific. The bottom-most nodes represent the outcomes that are reached after each player 




2 2 3 
Figure 8: Extensive Form of the Battle of Bismarck Sea Game 
(Courtesy: Colman, 1995, p. 55) 
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The nodes are enclosed in dashed loops to indicate the information sets to which they 
belong; when making a move, a player cannot distinguish between choice points enclosed within 
a single information set. Notice that the node labeled "Imamura" is in an information set of its 
own, but both of the nodes labeled "Kenney" are enclosed in a single information set. This 
indicates that at the time of choosing, Kenney does not know whether he has reached the left-
hand or right-hand node because he does not know in which direction Imamura has chosen to 
sail. Thus, this game is one of imperfect information, and the players are moving in ignorance of 
any preceding moves. [Note: The game would be strategically equivalent if the initial node 
were labeled "Kenney" and the succeeding "Imamura" nodes were enclosed in a single 
information set (Colman, 1995, p. 56).) 
In Figure 9 the Battle of Bismarck Sea game is represented in a payoff matrix. Recall 
that each row of the payoff matrix corresponds to Player I's strategies, and each column of the 
payoff matrix displays the normal form of the game. The normal form allows a game involving 
a sequence of moves to be depicted statically, with the players simultaneously choosing a row or 
a column. Any finite game in extensive form can be represented in normal form without the loss 
of strategically relevant information (Colman, 1982, p.50) . 
Imamura 
N S 
N 2 2 
Kenney ·-
s 1 3 
Figure 9: Normal Form of the Battle of Bismarck Sea Game 
(Courtesy: Colman, 1995, p. 57) 
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In the Battle of Bismarck Sea game, players who are rational according to the Minimax 
Theorem will choose their northern strategies, and the value of the game to each player is two 
days of bombing because that is the payoff that results from rational play on both sides. These 
minimax strategies were in fact the ones employed by Imamura and Kenney, and the Japanese 
suffered a decisive defeat; the Japanese convoy of ten warships and twelve transports carrying 
approximately 15,000 men was destroyed. The outcome cannot be blamed on any strategic error 
of Imamura; it was inherent in the payoff structure of the game, whose value was positive and 
thus favorable to Kenney (Colman, 1995, p. 58). 
Here the minimax strategies are optimal because they intersect in an equilibrium point of 
the game, or a Nash equilibrium. The Nash equilibrium concept has two particularly attractive 
characteristics : (1) It generalizes the dominant strategy equilibrium concept and the iterated 
dominance equilibrium concept; and (2) It yields a payoff for each player that is always at least 
as good as the maximum value each player could guarantee himself (Eichberger, p. 84). Thus, a 
key property of a Nash equilibrium is that no player has any incentive to deviate unilaterally 
from it; the players should have no reason to regret their strategy choices when the other players ' 
choices are made known (Colman, 1995, p. 59). In the Battle of Bismarck Sea game, the 
outcome would have been no better for the Japanese had they deviated unilaterally from the 
minimax strategy because they still would have suffered two days of bombing. If Kenney had 
deviated unilaterally, he also would have obtained a worse outcome. 
At this point it is worth mentioning that a minimax or equilibrium strategy does not 
necessarily take full advantage of irrational play on the part of an opponent. Sometimes a non-
minimax choice may serve as the best counter-strategy. For example, if Kenney would have had 
ample reason to believe that Imamura planned to sail south, then his best counter would have 
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been to sail south, even though this would not be a rational move according to formal game 
theory. Against an irrational opponent, it could be argued that the minimax principle loses some 
of its persuasive force, but in games against human adversaries the assumption of rationality is 
usually a safe one (Colman, 1995, p. 59). 
The Nash equilibrium is easy to locate in the Battle of Bismarck Sea game because its 
payoff matrix contains a saddle point. A saddle point of a payoff matrix is a minimum in its row 
and a maximum in its column. If maximin and minimax are equal, then and only then, must 
there be a saddle point in the payoff matrix where its value occurs. When a game has a saddle 
point, the saddle point is the expected outcome of rational play; it is the solution of the game 
(Poundstone, p. 54). The fact that a saddle point necessarily corresponds to the intersection of 
the players' equilibrium or minimax strategies is of particular usefulness when solving games 
that are more complicated than the Battle of Bismarck Sea game (Colman, 1995, pp. 59-60). 
V. Two-person Mixed-motive Games 
Games in which the players' preferences among the outcomes are neither identical nor 
diametrically opposed are called mixed-motive games. In mixed-motive games, players are 
motivated partly to cooperate and partly to compete with one another. A player in a mixed-
motive game must deal with both an intrapersonal and interpersonal conflict. In a mixed-motive 
game, it is not the case that what one player gains the other must lose. Mixed-motive games are 
sometimes referred to as variable-sum or nonzero games (Colman, 1995, p. 100). 
Throughout the period from the 1950s to the 1970s, experimental gaming research 
centered largely on two-person mixed-motive games, especially the Prisoner' s Dilemma game. 
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Experimental researchers were attracted to the Prisoner's Dilemma and other related games 
because they provide simple methods for investigating different aspects of strategic interaction 
(Colman, 1995, p. 134). 
The following example illustrates the main points of the Prisoner's Dilemma game: 
Two criminals are caught by the police, and because of a lack of evidence, the 
prosecution needs a confession to convict. If neither prisoner confesses, they will 
each be charged and convicted for a minor offense, which is one year less than a 
conviction for the main crime. The prosecutor offers each prisoner a deal. If 
Prisoner 1 confesses and Prisoner 2 does not, Prisoner 1 will get three years off 
his sentence whereas Prisoner 2 will get an extra year (-1) in prison (and vice-
versa). If both confess, they will be punished according to the law (Eichberger, p. 
65). 
The above situation can easily be translated into the following game in strategic form: 
There are two players, and each has a strategy set with two options, "to confess" (C) or "not to 
confess" (N). Figure 10 shows the payoff matrix for the possible strategies. 
Player 2 
N C 
Player 1 N I, I -1,3 
C 3, -1 0,0 
Figure 10: Prisoner 's Dilemma Payoff Matrix 
(Courtesy: Eichberger, p. 66) 
It is clear that there is no dilemma for the prisoners in terms of how they should behave. 
If Prisoner 2 confesses, Prisoner 1 is better off cooperating or else he will serve an extra year in 
prison. If Prisoner 2 does not confess, it is best for Prisoner 1 to confess, since doing so will 
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remove three years from his jail term. No matter how Prisoner 2 acts, it is best for Prisoner 1 to 
cooperate with the authorities (Eichberger, p. 66) 
By a similar argument, it is reasonable to conclude that Prisoner 2 will confess in any 
case. This leads one to predict (C,C) as the outcome of the game. The dilemma lies in the fact 
that this individually rational behavior precludes the best outcome for the prisoners, namely not 
to confess (N ,N) and to get a lighter sentence. Here the source of the dilemma is not the lack of 
communication between the prisoners but their incentives. Even if they could talk and agree not 
to confess, each prisoner has an incentive to break the agreement at the other' s expense 
(Eichberger, p. 66). 
The Prisoner's Dilemma game is fascinating because it involves two of the ma3or 
dilemmas in conflict situation, and also because it models problems as diverse as nuclear 
disarmament, wage negotiation, and the controversy of whooping cough vaccinations. The first 
dilemma focuses on the player's objective: Should the player look out for his personal interests 
or the group's interests? This conflict is between individual rationality (which would lead to a 
confession in Prisoner's Dilemma) and group rationality (which would suggest keeping quiet) 
(Thomas, p. 55). Here lies the psychologists' interest in the game. 
The second dilemma focuses on how often the Prisoner's Dilemma game will be played. 
If the game will only be played once, there is no reason to build up your opponent' s tmst in you; 
here it would seem best to confess. It can be shown that if the game is played a fixed number of 
times, any equilibrium pair of strategies will result in (C,C) being played all of the time (Thomas, 
p. 56). The argument proceeds as follows : Think of the last game. Since there will be no more 
games, both prisoners will choose to confess as in the one-game situation. Having decided on 
what happens in the final game, consider the second-to-last game. Since the last game's 
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strategies are now fixed one can think of this as really the last game, and so on. If the number of 
games to be played is unknown to the prisoners, then there will be equilibrium pairs that result in 
the (N,N) strategy being played all of the time. Interestingly, many experiments have been 
performed to see what happens in practice when these games are played. A. Rapoport and A. M. 
Chammah (1965) and M. Guyer and B. Perkel (1972) reported that players do keep silent in 
hopes that their opponents will follow suit. Once such a pattern is established they do sometimes 
"punish" opponents who confessed last time by confessing themselves, but the amount that this 
happens varies considerably depending upon gender, nationality, temperament, inducements, and 
the way in which the experiment is conducted (Thomas, p. 56). 
VI. Games with Incomplete Information 
The games that have been considered so far have all been games where the players know 
the exact payoffs that their opponents can obtain. This information can be key in helping players 
decide which strategy is their best strategy. Thus, complete payoff information is needed to 
determine a Nash equilibrium. 
When this assumption is relaxed, however, players can no longer predict what would be a 
best response for the other players; thus, they cannot determine what constitutes optimal behavior 
for themselves (Eichberger, p. 125). The following example illustrates the type of problem that 
arises when players have incomplete information about payoffs: 
Consider a potential entrant to a monopolist's market. Without entry, the 
monopolist earns three units of profit and the entrant no profit. Should the 
potential entrant enter the market of the monopolist, two reactions of the 
incumbent have to be considered: ( 1) The monopolist may accommodate the 
entrant, in which case its profit will be reduced to one unit and the entrant will 
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also make one unit of profit; or (2) The monopolist may fight entry, which will 
cause the entrant a loss of one unit (Eichberger, p. 124). 
The critical issue for the entrant concerns the likelihood that the monopolist will fight the 
entry. This likelihood depends on the monopolist's outcome if he fights the entrant. Figure 11 
captures the situation. 
Monopolist 
a f 
E ntrant e I, I - I, ;;, 
ne 0,3 0,3 
Figure 11: Competing Firms' Payoff Matrix 
(Courtesy: Eichberger, p. 124) 
Here e denotes the decision to enter, ne the decision to refrain from entering, a denotes 
the decision of the monopolist to accommodate the entrant, and f the decision to fight the entry. 
k represents the crucial payoff parameter. Without information as to whether k is larger or 
smaller than one, it is impossible for the entrant to predict the monopolist' s reaction to entry 
(Eichberger, p. 124). In this example the incomplete information is one-sided, but it is worth 
mentioning that each firm could be incompletely informed about the other firm's payoff. 
Vil. Closing Comments 
Game theory identifies players' optimal strategies 111 the face of interdependence and 
uncertainty . Games can be divided into two-person and n-person games, zero-sum and nonzero-
37 
sum games, and cooperative and non-cooperative games. Although this paper does not touch 
upon all of these aspects of game theory, it does offer a nice introduction of game theory and its 
applications for those who are not mathematical specialists. 
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